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Zero Residual Attacks on Industrial Control Systems and Stateful Countermeasures
Conference proceeding

Zero Residual Attacks on Industrial Control Systems and Stateful Countermeasures

Hamid Reza Ghaeini, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Jianying Zhou and Assoc Comp Machinery
Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, pp.1-10
01/01/2019

Abstract

Computer Science Computer Science, Information Systems Computer Science, Theory & Methods Engineering Engineering, Electrical & Electronic Science & Technology Technology
In this paper, we discuss the practical implementation of stealthy attacks on industrial control systems. We start by reviewing the attacks proposed in prior works. Then, we offer Zero-Residual Attacks (ZeRA), which allow the attacker to launch stealthy attacks leveraging estimation of the stateful anomaly detector and matching of residuals as a fraction of actual estimation residual. To perform the zero residual attack, the attacker will require the use of two state estimators each for the physical system state and the detector system state, adding complexity that was so far not discussed. We implement ZeRA and demonstrate its efficacy. Then, we propose to use a Stateful Detector (SD) to precisely detect such stealthy attacks. We design and implement the SD detector. The obtained results from the performance evaluation demonstrate that we can detect stealthy attacks such as the ZeRA, with precision above 99%, sensitivity above 99%, and Matthews correlation coefficient above 0.98.

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