Abstract
Water distribution systems the world over are being augmented with sensors and logic controllers to make them run more automatically, eÿciently, and reliably. However, these interconnected devices also expose such systems to greater risk of getting attacked, which can result in unexpected behaviour. As the world’s water distribution systems become increasingly threatened by cyber-physical attacks, the ability to realistically simulate the hydraulic e?ects of these attacks has never been more important. A standard approach in hydraulic modelling is to use demand-driven analysis, where the consumers’ water requirements are assumed to be met at all times. This approach does not allow for atypical scenarios, such as cyber-physical attacks, to be accurately simulated because the pressure may be insuÿcient to actually supply the required demand. In order to rectify this, an existing hydraulic modelling and attack toolkit, epanetCPA, was modified to add pressure-driven analysis capabilities. The toolkit was tested, calibrated, and verified in experiments using a real-world testbed network. It was then used to simulate a range of attack scenarios on a town-scale benchmark network model. This work showed that the toolkit can be used to realistically replicate and predict the performance of real-world networks subject to cyber-physical attacks. The findings of these simulations also have important implications for the design and operation of water distribution systems. The toolkit can thus help system operators continue to provide water to consumers despite the threat of attacks.