Abstract
This article examines the French response to the rise to power
of Adolf Hitler and the
Nazi party in Germany in January of 1933. It argues that French
intelligence warned civilian and
military leaders that the priorities of the new regime were rearmament
and the militarization of
German society in preparation for a war of conquest. This
essentially accurate appreciation of the
situation inside Germany had little impact on the course of
French foreign policy. At this juncture
French society was preoccupied with worsening economic crisis
and pacifist sentiment had reached its
inter-war zenith. The national focus was inward and domestic
concerns took priority over the external
threat from Germany. Finally, France was in a position of relative
isolation and could garner no
support for a policy of firmness from its erstwhile allies, Great
Britain and the United States. This
combination of national introspection and diplomatic isolation
deterred a succession of governments
from taking determined steps to meet the Nazi challenge in 1933.